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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Is the addition of a pollutant to groundwater, which is
tributary to, but not in close proximity with, traditionally
navigable surface water a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)?
B. In a 33 U.S.C. § 1365 enforcement action, alleging violation of a permit provision prohibiting discharges that "violate water quality standards," is the permittee/defendant
barred by 33 U.S.C. § 1369 from seeking dismissal of the
action, on the basis that the provision is not specific
enough to be an enforceable permit provision?
C. Is the interpretation of a provision prohibiting discharges
that "violate water quality standards" in a permit issued
by the federal government, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342,
governed by federal or state law when the provision is included routinely in federally issued permits and is also required to be in the permit by a certification condition
imposed by New Union pursuant 33 U.S.C. § 1341?
D. If the interpretation of the Clean Water Act provision
prohibiting discharges that "violate water quality standards" is governed by federal law, is the addition of a pollutant to navigable water causing, by itself or together
with other such additions, the water to be unfit for its
water quality standard designated use, a violation of the
provision without further administrative action to establish effluent limitations on the pollutant in the permit?
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A. Excluding "tributary"groundwaterfrom the
definition of "navigable waters" would
undermine Congress' intent to protect the
"waters of the United States" from
pollution ....................................
B. The weight of case authority in the courts
have held that tributarygroundwaters are
navigable waters ............................
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B. Upon approval by the EPA, a state's water
quality standards become federalized and the
EPA's interpretationof them supersedes the
state's interpretation ........................
C. The rights claimed in a citizens' suit under
the CWA are federal in nature and should be
governed by federal law .....................
IV. BECAUSE COMPLIANCE WITH WATER
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b. Legislative intent, especially with
respect to toxic pollutants, does not
tolerate a right to pollute
interpretationof dischargepermits ..
2. Narrow interpretationis consistent with
the CWA, but would impede the
enforcement of the CWA with frivolous
law suits and place a tremendous burden
on the states ............................
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GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a response to an appeal from an order entered by
Judge R. N. Remus in the United States District Court for the
District of New Union denying XXX Corporation's ("XXX")
motion to dismiss the action brought against them by Friends
of the Roaritan, Inc. ("FOR") for alleged violations of the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 and 1365 et seq.
(1996). The District Court held that the pollution of tributary
groundwater is a violation of the CWA. (R. at 6). It also ruled
that Section 509(b)(2) of the CWA does not bar XXX from
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questioning the provisions of its permit and that federal law
should be used to interpret XXX's permit. (R. at 7- 8). Finally, the Court held that the addition of a pollutant to navigable water that causes the water to be unfit for its water
quality standard is a violation of its permit, even without further administrative action to establish effluent limitations on
the pollutant in the permit. (R. at 10). XXX's motion to dismiss was denied, and it has appealed to this court for further
review while FOR cross-appeals for review of the decision on
ripeness. (R. at 1, 10).
For the purpose of review, questions of law are reviewable by the appellate court on a de novo standard. See Pierce
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988). The decision of the
District Court involves controlling questions of law and thus
the appropriate standard of review for this case is de novo.
XXX occupies a forty acre site situated one mile from the
Roaritan River. (R. at 4). FOR is a non-for profit organization dedicated to protecting the Roaritan River, a historically
navigable river in the State of New Union. FOR brought a
citizens' suit pursuant to Section 505 of the CWA against
XXX for two sets of alleged violations of Section 301(a) of the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1996). (R. at 3).
The first set of alleged violations concerns the discharge
without a CWA permit of pollutants from a waste pile on
XXX's property to groundwater, that eventually reach the
Roaritan River. (R. at 3). FOR alleges that the waste pile
contains a significant concentration of lead, confirmed by the
results of sampling done by the New Union Department of
Environmental Protection ("NUDEP"). (R. at 4). They also
allege that precipitation causes lead to leach into the groundwater, polluting the groundwater. (R. at 4). FOR further alleges that the polluted groundwater flows into the Roaritan
and contaminates it with lead. (R. at 4). New Union joins
FOR in asserting these allegations. (R. at 3).
The second set of alleged violations relates to XXX's discharge of selenium into the Roaritan. (R. at 3). The EPA approved the classification of the Roaritan as a Class AAA
water that was fit for human consumption without treatment
as part of New Union's submission of water quality standards
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pursuant to Section 303 of the CWA. (R. at 5). The discharge
by XXX is authorized by a permit issued by the Region XI
office of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). (R. at
4). FOR alleges that XXX violated this permit by discharging
selenium into the Roaritan, despite the fact that the permit
contains no limitation on selenium. (R. at 4). FOR argues
that Section IIA3 of the permit prohibits any discharge that
"violates water quality standards." (R. at 4). This provision
is part of the standard language contained in all permits issued by Region XI of the EPA and was also in the discharge
permit issued by the NUDEP. (R. at 4). The State of New
Union has not adopted water quality criterion for selenium,
but the EPA has promulgated a maximum contaminant level
("MCL") for selenium under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300(f) et seq., 40 C.F.R. § 141.62(b) (1997). (R. at 5).
FOR further alleges that the Roaritan cannot be used for its
designated water quality purpose as a direct result of XXX's
discharge of selenium, which it alleges exceeds the MCL. (R.
at 5).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
FOR urges that the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union denying XXX's motion to
dismiss should be upheld for the following reasons. First, the
groundwater tributary to the Roaritan River into which toxic
lead is leaching counts as "navigable water" under the CWA.
Congress explicitly stated its intent to broadly protect the
"waters of the United States" through the CWA. If tributary
groundwaters were to be excluded from the purview of the
CWA, then the entire CWA could be avoided by polluters who
would simply turn their polluting pipes into the ground.
Most courts, including the Supreme Court, have agreed with
this interpretation of Congressional intent, and have broadly
construed "navigable waters" to include tributaries to navigable surface waters and groundwaters tributary to navigable
surface waters.
Second, federal law must be used to interpret the provision prohibiting discharges that "violate water quality stan-
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dards" in a permit issued by the federal government pursuant
to Section 402 of the CWA. The legislative and statutory history of the CWA clearly indicate that one of the main reasons
that Congress passed the CWA was to maintain a uniform
level of basic water pollution standards. The courts have also
shown that state water quality standards, upon approval by
the EPA, become part of the federal law of water pollution.
Since these standards are federalized, the interpretation of
the provisions, in the permit by the EPA, supersedes any interpretation set forth by the NUDEP. The right of FOR to
claim a citizens' suit against XXX is a federally created right
set forth in Section 505 of the CWA. The courts have held
that the right to bring a citizens' suit only extends to situations where a federal issue is present.
Third, because compliance with water quality standards
are independently enforceable provisions of a NPDES permit
pursuant to the statutory language of the CWA, XXX has violated its discharge permit by exceeding water quality standards for selenium levels in the Roaritan River. Legislative
history reveals, and the federal courts support, the necessity
of recognizing both effluent limitations and water quality
standards as CWA regulatory tools. If effluent limitations
were the only enforcement tool of a NPDES permit, XXX
would still violate the permit because discharge of selenium
is not expressly authorized in its permit. Penalizing any discharge of any pollutant not specifically authorized with an effluent limitation is the only interpretation of NPDES permits
that would be consistent with the intent of the CWA. The
statutory language, legislative history, and strict enforcement of the CWA do not tolerate a right to pollute interpretation of NPDES permits. For the above mentioned reasons,
FOR respectfully requests this Court to uphold the District
Court's denial of XXX's motion to dismiss.
In addition, FOR urges that the District Court's decision,
with regards to the reviewability of XXX's NPDES permit,
should be overruled. XXX's NPDES permit should not be reviewed by this court, as the court has no jurisdiction to do so
under the provisions of the CWA. Courts have consistently
held that when Congress includes specific judicial review pro-
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visions in legislation, these provisions are to be viewed as the
exclusive means of review. XXX's contention that it should be
excused for allowing the statute of limitations to lapse because the permit was not ripe for review should be dismissed
because courts have held that they will not engage in "retrospective ripeness review" except in the most extreme of circumstances. Given that the permit was clearly ripe for
review during the statutorily-defined period of review, XXX
may not be excused for missing the deadline.
ARGUMENT
I.

GROUNDWATER TRIBUTARY TO THE
ROARITAN RIVER, INTO WHICH TOXIC LEAD
IS LEACHING, COUNTS AS "NAVIGABLE
WATER" UNDER THE CLEAN WATER
ACT.

The evidence presented at the trial court showed that
lead, which is commonly known to be highly toxic to both
humans and wildlife, was leaching from Defendant's waste
pile and through groundwaters that discharge into the
Roaritan River. (R. at 4). Because the groundwaters flow
into the Roaritan River, they are tributariesof the Roaritan.
As the trial court pointed out, the underground tributaries
should be covered under the CWA since they are navigable
waters. (R. at 6). Congress clearly intended tributary
groundwaters to be considered navigable waters. This interpretation has been upheld by a majority of the courts, including the Supreme Court.
A.

Excluding "tributary"groundwaterfrom the definition
of "navigable waters" would undermine Congress'
intent to protect the "waters of the United States"
from pollution.

Excluding "tributary" groundwater from the definition of
"navigable waters" would undermine Congress' intent to protect the "waters of the United States" from pollution. When
passing the CWA, Congress clearly stated that "[tihe objective
of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
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cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1996). As noted by the Supreme Court, it was the
purpose of the Act to establish an all-encompassing program
of water pollution and regulation. See City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981). The CWA
requires that either the EPA or the states eliminate all discharges of pollutants from point sources into navigable waters that is not allowed by an NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342 (1996). Discharge into navigable waters without such
a permit is prohibited under the CWA. See id. The traditional definition of "navigable waters" included only waters
which could support maritime traffic ("navigable-in-fact").
See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). But,
the CWA departs from this traditional definition and only requires that navigable waters be "waters of the United
States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1996) (See Appendix).
Groundwaters in general can be categorized as "tributary" groundwaters and non-tributary, or isolated groundwaters; tributary groundwaters flow into surface waters and
isolated groundwaters do not. See Getches, Water Law in a
Nutshell, 226 (1984). The majority of courts have found that
tributary groundwaters are navigable waters. In the current
matter, groundwater is flowing from XXX's facility toward
the Roaritan River, thus making it tributary groundwater.
(R. at 4).
If the tributaries of surface waters are not protected, the
entire CWA may be undermined. See United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1329 (6th Cir.
1974). As the court in Ashland Oil suggested, if tributary
groundwaters are not held to be navigable waters, polluters
could simply dump unlimited amounts of pollutants into
tributaries to navigable surface waters without fear of regulation. In this way, the CWA could be completely avoided
simply by positioning pollution sources farther away from
navigable-in-fact waters, but that are still hydrologically connected to those waters. See id. at 1329. Tributary groundwaters are as much tributaries as surface tributaries, and both
must be protected with equal force. This position is also reflected in the regulations of the EPA, the agency primarily
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responsible for implementing the CWA. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(e)
(1997) (EPA's definition of "navigable waters" includes
"tributaries" of such waters, which are not distinguished between above or below-ground tributaries).
The Supreme Court in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-33 (1985), held that
the term "navigable water" should be construed as broadly as
possible. In Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court was
presented with a case in which a housing developer was filling in wetland areas without an NPDES permit. Id. at 121.
Noting from the Senate report on the CWA that "[w]ater
moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of
pollutants be controlled at the source," the Court interpreted
Congress' intent in promulgating the CWA as intending to
cover as broad of a range of waters as possible. Id. at 134
(quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 77 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742). Noting the Corps of Engineers'
finding that wetlands and "navigable-in-fact" waters were intimately connected, the Court held that wetlands must be
considered navigable waters and be regulated under the
CWA.
See id. at 134-35. Interestingly, the Court also
pointed out that wetlands that are not actually connected to
"bodies of water" may still be regulated since they may "drain
into those waters" and thus need to be regulated. Id. at 136.
Implicit in this comment is that the Court realized the draining (when there was no surface connection) would occur
through the ground, thus turning the water into groundwater. It flows from the Court's interpretation of the CWA
that groundwaters should be regulated when they are closely
connected to surface waters, because otherwise these waters
that inter-circulate will contaminate each other and lead to
the very contamination and pollution that the CWA was
promulgated to prevent.
Nowhere in the statutory or legislative record does it
state that navigable waters are not to include tributary
groundwaters. See Phillip M. Quatrochi, GroundwaterJurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act: The Tributary Groundwater Dilemma, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 603, 614 (1996).
Neither can any part of the record of Congressional intent be
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conclusively interpreted as excluding tributary groundwater
from being navigable water. See Mary Christina Wood, RegulatingDischargesinto Groundwater:The CrucialLink in Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 Harv. Envtl. L.
Rev. 569, 592 (1988). Two particular pieces of legislative history have been used to argue that tributary groundwater is
not navigable water, the report of the Senate Committee on
Public Works on the CWA's applicability to groundwater, see
S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3739, and the defeat of Senator Aspin's amendment
that would have explicitly included groundwater as navigable
water. See Hearings on H.R. 11896 et. al. before the House
Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Ses. (1972), reprinted in Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, at 597.
If Congress had any intent to group tributary and stationary groundwaters together and exclude them both from the
purview of the CWA, one would have expected at least one
single tributary groundwater example to be used somewhere
in the reports of the legislative history. Yet, such a reference
is nowhere to be found and only isolated groundwaters are
mentioned, thus suggesting that Congress only intended to
exclude isolated groundwater from the CWA. The Senate
Committee Report states as follows: "Several bills pending
before the Committee provided authority to establish federally approved standards for groundwaters which permeate
rock, soil, and other subsurface formations. Because the jurisdiction regarding groundwaters is so complex and varied
from State to State, the Committee did not adopt this recommendation." S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739. However, in a paragraph conveniently omitted by the court's holding that tributary groundwater is not navigable water, the report goes on to address
the desirability of regulating groundwater in the future:
Deep-well disposal raises a possibility of irrevocable damage to public aquifers and slow dissemination of pollutants
into potential water supplies . .. [Djeep disposal wells are
becoming more prevalent throughout the nation, while
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deep wells are predicted to supply increasing percentages
of public water in the arid west and southwest in the next
two decades.
Id. at 3739 (emphasis added). Clearly, the Senate here was
talking about isolated groundwaters, not tributary groundwaters. After discussing the rationale for not including the
term "groundwater" in the definition of navigable water, the
discussion immediately turns to deep-well disposal of pollutants, aquifers and deep-well aquifers (all isolated groundwaters). See id. It would be inconsistent with the overall
context of this text to construct the above as talking about
tributary groundwater.
Similarly, the defeat of the Aspin Amendment has been
misinterpreted by a few courts as evidence that Congress did
not mean for tributary groundwater to be considered navigable water. See Wood, supra, at 614. The Aspin Amendment
would have included all groundwaters as navigable waters,
but also would have eliminated CWA exemptions for deep gas
and oil well injection disposal (where pollutants are injected
into empty oil and gas wells). See id. at 617. Since there
were these two other elements to the Amendment, its defeat
cannot be interpreted as addressing the issue of tributary
groundwater. Furthermore, the common understanding
among members of Congress was that all tributaries to navigable-in-fact waters were to be covered under the CWA, including tributary groundwaters. See id. at 614-15 n.17.
Thus, it is unnecessary to believe that Congress left such
a huge loophole in the CWA. As the Ashland Oil court stated,
one would "make a mockery of those powers if its authority to
control pollution was limited to the bed of the navigable
stream itself. The tributaries which join to form the river
could then be used as open sewers as far as federal regulation
was concerned." Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d. at 1326. Members of
Congress did not mean for the CWA to be so easily circumvented, and there is no need to rely on a strained interpretation of legislative intent to hold otherwise. See Wood, supra,
at 617-18.
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The weight of case authority in the courts have held
that tributary groundwaters are navigable waters.

Many courts have ruled that tributary groundwater is to
be considered navigable water. In Washington Wilderness
Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D.
Wash. 1994), the Eastern District Court of Washington held
that tributary groundwaters are to be considered navigable
waters. Washington Wilderness Coalition involved a mine
that was draining contaminated water from an unlined tailing pond into nearby surface waters. See id. at 985. The
court reviewed the relevant legislative history, and concluded
that Congress intended to regulate tributary groundwater
when it passed the CWA. See id. at 990. The Washington
Wilderness Coalition decision was followed by the Southern
District Court of Iowa in the Eighth Circuit in Williams Pipe
Line v. Bayer Co., 964 F. Supp. 130, 1319-20 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
Also in the Ninth Circuit, in McClellan Ecological Seepage
Situation ("MESS") v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1196
(E.D. Cal. 1988) (vacated on other grounds), the court held
that tributary groundwaters are covered by the CWA if a direct hydrological link can be proven. Relying on Riverside
Bayview Homes, the court found that it was Congress' intent
to protect waters that will flow into surface waters, and thus
tributary groundwaters must be considered navigable waters. See MESS at 1196. In the current matter, it has been
shown that groundwaters under XXX's facility are migrating
toward the Roaritan, thus making them tributary groundwaters. (R. at 4). It is this tributary status that many courts
have found dispositive in finding groundwaters to be navigable waters.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Quivira
Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1985),
that an "arroyo" (a normally dry gully), was in fact "navigable
water," mostly because of a groundwater connection running
under the arroyo to navigable-in-fact waters downstream.
See id. at 130. Because of the groundwater connection, even
disposal into the arroyo during dry periods is covered under
the CWA. See id. Although the ruling spoke directly to

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/7

18

1999]

BRIEF

groundwater where there is also an intermittent surface connection, this court proposed an extremely broad definition of
groundwater that can include tributary groundwater, stating
that "it was the clear intent of Congress to regulate the waters of the United States to the fullest extent possible." Id.
Presently, the connection between the groundwaters under
XXX's property and the Roaritan is much more obvious and
much faster than the connection in Quivira. In Quivira,only
the possibility of a connection with navigable-in-fact waters
was thought required for the CWA to cover the pollution outfall. See id. Later in the Ninth Circuit, the Quivira holding
was followed in Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F.
Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo. 1993) and in Friends of Santa Fe
County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp 1333, 1358
(D.N.M. 1995).
The most recent case on the point is Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of New York. v. Mobil Corp., No. CIVA 96-CV1781, 1998 WL
160820 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1998), where the Northern District
Court of New York concluded that there were no circuit level
cases holding that tributary groundwater was not navigable
water. 1998 WL 160820, at *2. Following the lead of the majority of cases, the court held that because a hydrological connection could be proved, a CWA claim was sustainable.
While not all courts have held that tributary groundwaters are navigable waters, the adverse case law is distinguishable. In Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson
Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994), a small town was attempting to prevent a warehouse from being built nearby. See id.
at 963. The town brought a multitude of legal actions against
the builders, most of which the court found spurious. See id.
In Dayton Hudson, there was no evidence that pollution had
occurred or would occur in the future since it dealt with a
point-source that had not yet come into existence. See id. at
962-63.
In the current matter, there is clearly pollution already
occurring as a result of the lead leaching into groundwater on
XXX's property and there is a real threat to the health of the
water and those who use the water. In Dayton Hudson, there
is also every reason to believe that the entire case was spuri-
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ous and that the court was simply looking for any reason to
throw it out, as evidenced by Judge Easterbrook's derogatory
comments towards plaintiffs in the court's opinion. See id. at
963. Furthermore, the Judge's reasoning about Congress' intent in passing the CWA can be criticized for flatly mis-interpreting the intent of Congress and Congress' definition of
navigable waters as "the waters of the United States." As has
been noted, "waters of the United States" should be interpreted to the fullest extent possible under the commerce
clause of the Constitution. See Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d at
1324. Judge Easterbrook chose to disregard prevailing interpretations of the Constitution.
Each case that has held against classifying tributary
groundwater as navigable water has relied on the same
equivocal interpretation that Congress did not really intend
to protect navigable surface waters through the CWA by leaving a huge loophole. Furthermore, all of the recent cases on
the matter cite back to Dayton Hudson, a case which is easily
distinguished and relies on strained logic to exclude tributary
groundwaters. See Allegany Envtl. Action Coalition v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 96-2178, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1838 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30,1998); Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312 (D.
Or. 1997); Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D.
Mich. 1985). Thus, there is little or no persuasive authority
available on which to found a holding that tributary groundwater is not navigable water.
Here, the underground tributaries on XXX's property
must be considered navigable waters and thus be subject to
the purview of the CWA. There is a clear connection between
the groundwaters and the Roaritan River, thus making it
tributary groundwater. (R. at 4). To deny these tributaries
the protection due to them under the CWA would have serious negative effects. Most immediately, people who use and
enjoy the Roaritan River would be subject to possible lead
poisoning. In the long-term, the progress made toward reducing pollution in navigable waters may be reversed by the creation of a huge loophole in the CWA. Congress did not intend
for there to be such a huge loophole, and there is no reason
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for this court to rely on a strained interpretation of legislative
history to justify a ruling that will undercut the clear intent
of Congress in protecting the waters of the United States.
II. XXX IS BARRED FROM SEEKING DISMISSAL
BECAUSE CONGRESS' INTENT WAS TO
PROVIDE A TIME-LIMITED VENUE AND
THE ISSUE OF XXX'S PERMIT BEING
ENFORCEABLE WAS RIPE WHEN IT WAS
ISSUED.
XXX's request to have its permit reviewed should be denied, since (1) following Eagle-PicherIndus., Inc. v. EPA, 759
F.2d 905, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1985), it should not matter whether
the controversy was or was not ripe at the time specified by
Congress for judicial review because Congress meant to establish an absolute deadline for review, and (2) even if the
court chooses to engage in a retrospective ripeness review,
the controversy was surely ripe. Whether or not the permit is
too vague to enforce is a legal question presumed to be ripe
from the beginning. Furthermore, the "hardship" prong of
the ripeness analysis militates in favor of viewing the controversy as having been ripe from the beginning. Hardship on
XXX would have been avoided if it had made a timely request
for review, but instead it has made it hard on itself by delaying its petition for review until an enforcement action was
initiated.
A.

There is a clear statutory limit for the judicial review of
NPDES permits of 120 days after the agency
permitting action is taken so that appellate court
jurisdictionis eliminated if the 120-day period
expires.

The CWA clearly bars judicial review of NPDES permitting decisions 120 days after the permit is issued or denied.
Section 509(b)(2) of the CWA states unequivocally that if judicial review is not sought for an NPDES permitting action as
allowed by Section 509(b)(1), it "shall not be subject to judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforce-
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ment." 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2) (1996). Section 509(b)(1)(G)
clearly states that 120 days are available to seek review in
the United States Court of Appeals after an action pursuant
to Section 509(b)(1)(F) in "issuing or denying any permit
under section 1342 of this title." 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(G)
(1996). These two sections, read in tandem, call for a nearly
absolute bar of judicial review of permitting actions that are
not brought within 120-days of the issuance of the permit.
The legislative history supports this interpretation of the
clear prescriptive language in Section 509 of the CWA. See S.
Rep. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3750-51. The Senate Report on the CWA states, "[in order to
maintain the integrity of the time sequences provided
throughout the CWA, the section would provide that any review sought must be filed within 30 days of the date of the
challenged promulgation or other action." Id. at 3751. The
version of the CWA finally adopted included a 90-day instead
of 30-day statute of limitation, but the "emphasis upon specific time limitation remained." Peabody Coal Co. v. Train,
518 F.2d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir. 1975). The CWA was amended
in 1982, when the 90-day statute of limitation was extended
to 120-days. See Clean Water Act Amendments of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 100-4, § 505(a) (1982). The Senate Report made clear
that the Supreme Court had permitted the limitation of judicial review on agency actions where there was "clear evidence
of legislative intent." S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971), reprintedin
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3750-51 (quoting Abbott Lab. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967)).
The Circuit Courts have adopted the view that statutory
limitations on review serve as a statute of limitation that
bars any judicial action. See W. Nebraska Resources Council
v. EPA, 793 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1986) (Safe Drinking Water
Act); Texas Mun. PowerAgency v. EPA, 799 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1986) (CWA); Cerro Copper Products Co. v. Ruckelsh, 766
F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1985) (CWA); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 673 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (CWA);
Sun Enters., Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280 (2nd Cir. 1976)
(CWA, Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act); Tanner's Council
of Am. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1976) (CWA);
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Peabody Coal, 518 F.2d at 940 (CWA). The 120-day period
begins to run upon the issuance of the permit. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 566 F.2d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 1977).
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Homestake Mining Co. v.
EPA, 584 F.2d 862 (8th Cir. 1978), illustrates this time limitation in seeking review of permitting decisions. There, a
mining company sought to have its NPDES permit reviewed
pursuant to Section 509(b)(1) of the CWA. See id. at 863. The
court held it was without jurisdiction to hear the case since
Plaintiffs petition was filed after the 90-day (the limit at the
time) deadline where petitioners simply waited too long to file
a petition. See id.
The time limitations of the CWA thus bar review of
XXX's permit. As noted by the District Court, XXX has failed
to request judicial review of its NPDES permit within the
statutory limitation. Hence, as was the case in Homestake
Mining, the courts are without jurisdiction to review any aspects of the permit. Had circumstances arisen after the permitting procedure that brought up a new conflict, review may
be available. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(G) (stating exception to
bar of judicial review). However, no new circumstances have
arisen in the current situation that would warrant the relaxation of the statute of limitations.
B.

Courts are reluctant to engage in "retrospective ripeness
review," but even if this court engages in such review,
any issue over whether XXX's permit was specific
enough to be enforceable was ripe when the
permit was issued.

The issue of ripeness may not be invoked to give XXX an
excuse for failing to file a review during the statutorily defined period. The court should hardly ever engage in "retrospective ripeness analysis." See Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at
909; see also Pennsylvania Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. United
States Dep't. of Health And Human Serv., 101 F.3d 939, 945
(3rd Cir. 1996). The doctrine of ripeness is almost always applied to "here and now" situations, not to instances when one
is looking back to determine if a case would have been ripe.
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See Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 912. The doctrine developed
with respect to, and is applied in, the context of cases that are
brought into court that are not yet decidable in litigation. See
Eagle-Picher,759 F.2d at 914.
The D.C. Circuit Court in Eagle-Picher,was asked to excuse a group of plaintiffs from missing a statutorily-imposed
deadline for judicial review pursuant to a CERCLA rulemaking action. Id. at 908. The court harshly rejected the request,
stating: [wie emphasize first that petitioners who delay filing
requests for review on their own assessment of when an issue
is ripe for review do so at the risk of finding their claims timebarred. Normally, the appropriate time for a judicial determination of the ripeness of an issue is within the prescribed
statutory period for review. In general, we will refuse to hypothesize whether, in retrospect, a claim would have been
deemed ripe for review had it been brought during the statutory period, in order to save an untimely claim. Id. at 909.
The Eagle-Pichercourt stated that it was not within its
bounds to second guess Congress' intent to limit the time allotted to judicial review in its pursuit of administrative efficiency. See id. at 912. The doctrines of timeliness and
ripeness are inapposite. Ripeness is only an issue with regard to the relationship between the courts and the administrative agencies, while timeliness requirements "are
intended to prevent courts from 'entangling themselves' in
disputes which Congress has determined have been raised
too late and to protect agencies from endless judicial interference with formalized administrative policy." Id. at 913. But
the court warns about confusing ripeness and timeliness: [als
a general proposition, however, if there is any doubt about
the ripeness of a claim, petitioners must bring their challenge
in a timely fashion or risk being barred. Courts simply are
not well-suited to answering hypothetical questions which involve guessing what the court might have done in the past.
Furthermore, if we were routinely to conduct retrospective
ripeness analyses where a late petitioner offers no compelling
justification for not having filed his claim in a timely manner,
we would wreak havoc with the congressional intention that
repose be brought to final agency action. Id. at 914.
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The Eagle-Picher court noted only two instances when
the court ought to engage in a retrospective ripeness analysis:
1) when "events occur or information becomes available after
the statutory review period expires that create a challenge
that did not previously exist, or 2) where petitioner's claim is,
under [precedent,] indisputably not ripe until the agency
takes further action." Id. at 914.
In the current matter the court should presume that the
controversy was ripe and thus should bar review of the permit provisions. Given the record, there is no evidence that
any new events or information have arisen after the expiration of XXX's window of statutory review. The only excuse
that XXX could raise to defend its failure to meet Congress'
statutorily imposed deadline is to construe the current controversy as having been "indisputably not ripe" during the period of review.
The current controversy was indisputably ripe during
the review period, and it should certainly be barred from
present review. In promulgating a two prong pre-enforcement ripeness test the Supreme Court stated in Abbott Laboratories that the court should consider "[1)]the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision and [2)]the hardship to the parties
of withholding court consideration." Abbot Lab., 387 U.S. at
149. Several cases have held that purely legal questions are
automatically assumed to be ripe. See id.; Continental Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In the
instance of such a legal question, no actual facts would serve
a purpose in the dispute. Under the second prong of "hardship to parties," the Continental Airlines court held that the
court must evaluate "the interest of those who seek relief
from the challenged action's 'immediate and practical impact'
upon them." ContinentalAirlines, 522 F.2d at 126.
No courts have ever found challenges to NPDES permit
decisions to be unripe. Typically, successful ripeness challenges have been brought with respect to general rulemaking
agency actions. See Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Costle, 580
F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In Diamond Shamrock, a
group of plaintiffs challenged rules that were designed to
guide NPDES permit making decisions. See id. The court
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held the controversy to be unripe, because it was unclear how
the new rules would effect actual permit making decisions.
See id. at 674. Since it was the actual NPDES permits themselves that imposed limitations on the effluent outfall from
the petitioner's plants and not the rules on the issuance of the
permits, the controversy could not be ripe until the permits
were actually issued. See id. Thus, the issues were found to
be unfit for review and there was no demonstrated hardship
on the petitioners in delaying adjudication until the issue was
ripe. See id. at 675.
Similarly, the cases cited by the District Court in the
present matter to support the finding that the controversy
was not ripe are easily distinguished from the current situation where XXX has formally received an NPDES permit. (R.
at 7). In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Train, 649 F.2d 481
(7th Cir. 1980), the court ruled on a regulation that was directed at the states that might or might not result in state
water regulations. See id. at 488. In the current matter,
XXX is contesting an NPDES permit itself that has clear implications, it is not contesting a guideline about a future permitting action. In NationalResources Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993), the controversy was found
to be unripe because EPA guidelines were found not to constitute "final agency action" that would warrant review, in that
they were general unenforceable guidelines rather than
rules. Id. at 1408. In the present case, XXX's permit is the
result of a final agency action that has resulted in a final and
currently unreviewable NPDES permit. Therefore, even if
this court chooses to conduct a "retrospective ripeness review," the court should find that the permit was ripe for review when it was originally issued.
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THE INTERPRETATION OF A PROVISION
PROHIBITING DISCHARGES THAT
"VIOLATE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS"
IN A PERMIT ISSUED BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL LAW WHEN THE PROVISION,
ROUTINELY INCLUDED IN FEDERALLY
ISSUED PERMITS, IS REQUIRED TO BE IN
THE PERMIT BY A CERTIFICATION
CONDITION IMPOSED BY NEW UNION.

Federal law should be used to interpret the provision in
the permit because XXX's contention that state law should
govern this matter is based on the erroneous conclusion that
a state which develops its own water quality standards is the
exclusive judge of whether those standards are violated.
XXX's conclusion is flawed because it ignores the federal government's interest in maintaining a uniform level of basic
water pollution standards, one of Congress' main objectives
in passing the CWA. It also fails to take into account the case
law that clearly articulates that state water quality standards are to be incorporated into the federal statute upon approval by the EPA. Furthermore, FOR's claim of the right to
bring a citizens' suit under the CWA is a federally created
right that necessitates the application of federal law.
A.

The application of federal law is necessary to maintain
a uniform, basic standardfor the quality of water.

The CWA's goal to maintain a uniform, basic standard for
the quality of water requires that federal law be used to interpret XXX's permit. If federal law is not used to interpret basic water quality standards, then states will be able to
subvert this goal of the CWA by maintaining water pollution
programs that do not meet the minimum standards of the
federal government.
Congress passed the CWA "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1996). Prior to the passage of
the legislation, the federal water pollution control program
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had been inadequate in every vital respect. See EPA v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203
(1976). The problems stemmed from the awkwardly shared
federal and state responsibility for promulgating such standards and the lack of enforcement procedures. See id. The
fact that some states developed water quality standards and
plan to implement them, whereas others did not and some
dischargers were required to obtain both federal and state
permits made it very difficult to develop and enforce standards to regulate the conduct of individual polluters. See id.
The Supreme Court characterized the CWA as "an all encompassing program of water pollution regulation whose
main purpose was to establish a comprehensive long range
policy for the elimination of water pollution." City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
Although Congress created this comprehensive federal program, it still delegated a great deal of power to the states.
Specifically, the program grants states the authority to issue
NPDES permits that meet basic federal requirements. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1996) (See Appendix). Once the state program has been approved, the federal program that had been
operating in the state is suspended. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(c)(1) (1996) (See Appendix). Water pollution is clearly
a matter of both federal and state interest and regulation.
See Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Upjohn Co, 660 F.
Supp. 1397, 1406 (D. Conn. 1987).
The federal interest in maintaining basic, uniform standards of water pollution laws provides a compelling reason
why federal law should apply in this case. In Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972), the Supreme Court
held that the pollution of the nation's navigable waterways
requires a uniform federal rule of decision. See id. In order
to maintain this uniform, basic level of water protection, all
state programs that seek to issue NPDES permits must be
approved by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(i) and 1342(b). The
requirement in XXX's permit that prohibits discharges that
"violate water quality standards" is routinely included in
every federal permit and sets a basic standard for water pollution programs. (R. at 4).
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The CWA itself suggests that federal law should be used
to interpret the basic provisions of the permit. The law gives
the Administrator of the EPA a veto over state programs that
fall below the basic requirements set by the federal government. When the Administrator determines that a state is not
administering a program in accordance with the basic requirements of the CWA, he or she can take appropriate corrective action and withdraw approval of the program. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1996) (See Appendix). The Administrator can also block the issuance of an NPDES permit if he or
she determines that the permit does not uphold the guidelines and requirements of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(d)(2) (1996) (See Appendix). If the state does not resubmit a permit that addresses these objections, the Administrator may then issue the permit in accordance with federal
guidelines and requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4) (1996)
(See Appendix). Furthermore, "if the EPA recommends
changes to the standards and the state fails to comply with
that recommendation, the Act authorizes the EPA to promulgate water quality standards for the State." Arkansas v.
Oklahoma Envtl. ProtectionAgency, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992)
(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)). These powers of the Administrator are consistent with the savings provision of the CWA
which only prohibits the federal government from interfering
with state water pollution laws that are more stringent than
federal laws. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1996) (See Appendix).
The veto that the CWA delegates to the Administrator
over state programs shows that there is a significant federal
interest at stake when the states do not meet the minimum
requirements set by the federal government. In Int'l. Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987), the Supreme Court
stated, "it is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of both
federal and state law is to eliminate pollution. A state law
also is preempted if it interferes with the methods by which
the federal statute was designed to reach this goal." Id.
In Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Virginia State Water
Control Bd, 495 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (E.D. Va. 1980), the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that a federal question existed when a court had to determine "whether
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the State Board had satisfied the Act's minimum federal
guarantees for NPDES permits." Id. The prohibitions set
forth in the CWA cannot be negated by a state law or statute.
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 731 F.2d 403,
407 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bd.of Harbor Comm'rs,
73 F.R.D. 460, 462 (D. Del. 1977).
XXX argues that the particular water standards should
be governed by state law because they were developed by the
New Union Department of Environmental Protection. If
state law governs this matter and the less stringent requirements are upheld, then the states would effectively have the
power to subvert the goals of the federal government. The
water pollution standards would inevitably revert to their
pre-1972 form where each state maintained a different level
of water pollution. The federal interest in maintaining these
basic standards leads to the conclusion that "it is federal, not
state law that in the end controls the pollution of interstate
or navigable waters." Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
at 102. "If the Act's basic requirements are violated, the allegations would necessitate the interpretation of federal statute." Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 495 F. Supp. at 1234.
B.

Upon approval by the EPA, a state's water quality
standards become federalized and the EPA's
interpretationof them supersedes the state's
interpretation.

In order to maintain a uniform, national standard of
water quality, EPA regulations require an NPDES permit to
comply with the applicable water quality requirements of all
affected states. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 109.
These regulations incorporate into federal law those state law
standards the Agency determines to be applicable. See id.
The state water quality standards, promulgated by the states
with substantial guidance from the EPA and approved by the
Agency, then become part of the federal law of water pollution control. See id.
The Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma held that
the EPA could mandate that Arkansas comply with the more
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stringent water pollution regulations set by Oklahoma. See
id. at 105. The Supreme Court stated, "[t]he application of
state water quality standards in the interstate context is
wholly consistent with the Act's broad purpose to 'restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's water."' Id. at 106 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
In City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (10th
Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
EPA may impose the more stringent water quality standards
of an Indian tribe in federal NPDES permits in upstream
states. See id. In both of these situations, the EPA adopted
the state water pollution regulations and made them part of
the federal law. They then forced other entities to conform to
these newly federalized standards.
Arkansas v. Oklahoma and City of Albuquerque show
that the clean water laws passed by states are federal in nature because they are incorporated into the CWA. Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S., at 109; City of Albuquerque, 97 F.3d
at 424. Since the state water quality standards have a federal character, "the EPA's reasonable, consistently held interpretation of those standards is entitled to substantial
deference." Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 110 (citing
INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183,
189-90 (1991); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). In Hoffman Homes,
Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to the judgment of the
Chief Judicial Officer of the Environmental Protection in interpreting a federal regulation dealing with wetlands. See id.
The Seventh Circuit stated, "an agency's construction of its
own regulation binds a court in all but extraordinary cases."
Id. (quoting Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d
408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987)). This judgment was reiterated in
Arkansas v. Oklahoma when the Supreme Court concluded,
"[i]t is not our role, or that of the Court of Appeals, to decide
which policy choice is the better one, for it is clear that Congress has entrusted such decision to the Environmental Protection Agency." Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 114.
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The adoption of the state water quality standards by the
federal statute clearly indicates that the interpretation by
federal law should govern this matter. Therefore, XXX's assertion that the state water quality standards were promulgated by NUDEP is not an important factor in this analysis.
C.

The rights claimed in a citizens' suit under the CWA
are federal in nature and should be governed by
federal law.

The right claimed by FOR in a citizens' suit against XXX
is a federally created right, which requires the application of
federal law. According to Section 505 of the CWA, any citizen
may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any
other person or governmental agency who is alleged to be in
violation of an effluent standard or limitation under this
chapter. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1996) (See Appendix). The district courts have jurisdiction to enforce this right without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties, because of the presence of a federal issue. See id.
The rights of citizens to bring actions through this provision is a federally created right set forth by a federal statute.
"Federal law, not state law, must control in determining the
rules governing enforcement in a federal court of rights and
remedies created by a federal statute." Bd. of Harbor
Comm'rs, 73 F.R.D. at 462. Justice Frankfurter observed,
"[wihere resort is had to a federal court not on grounds of diversity of citizenship but because a federal right is claimed,
the limitations upon the courts of a State do not control a federal court sitting in the State." Id. (quoting Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947)). In Atlantic States Legal
Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 359 (2nd
Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
"state regulations, including the provisions of SPDES permits, which mandate a greater scope of coverage than that
required by the federal CWA and its implementing regulations are not enforceable through a citizen suit." Id.; see also
United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 616
(1992). This holding shows that citizens' suits are only applicable when a basic federal issue is in question. Since a fed-
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eral statute provides FOR the right to bring forth this
citizens' suit that alleges that basic federal standards have
been violated, federal law should govern this matter.
IV.

BECAUSE COMPLIANCE WITH WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS IS AN
INDEPENDENTLY ENFORCEABLE
CONDITION OF FEDERALLY
GOVERNED DISCHARGE PERMITS, XXX HAS
VIOLATED ITS DISCHARGE PERMIT
WITHOUT FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION TO ESTABLISH EFFLUENT
LIMITATIONS.

XXX has discharged selenium, a toxic pollutant, into the
Roaritan River, making it unfit for human consumption. (R.
at 5). This violation of the water quality standards of the
river is an explicit violation of the conditions of the discharge
permit issued to XXX from the EPA. The CWA permit provision precluding XXX Corp from activity that "violates water
quality standards" is an enforceable condition under federal
law without further establishment of any effluent limitation.
The statutory language, legislative intent, and case law conclusively establish that water quality standards are independent, enforceable conditions of discharge permits.
Furthermore, by not enforcing water quality standard
conditions in discharge permits, the court will limit the enforcement of discharge permits solely to the violation of effluent limitations. Under such enforcement, any discharge not
authorized via specific effluent limitations in a federally approved permit would violate the CWA and be subject to penalties. Any other enforcement of discharge permits would be
inconsistent with the language, intent, and strict enforcement of the CWA. Because XXX was not specifically authorized to discharge selenium via an effluent limitation in its
permit, XXX has violated the permit even if the water quality
standard provision is found unenforceable. (R. at 4).
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The Clean Water Act endorses the enforcement of the
water quality standards in the XXX dischargepermit.

Because compliance with water quality standards is a
condition of the XXX permit under Section 401 of the CWA,
violation of this condition is subject to citizen enforcement
pursuant to Section 505(f). 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1365(f)
(1996) (See Appendix). As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
the statutory language in Section 401 of the CWA authorizes
the inclusion of water quality standard provisions in NPDES
discharge permits. See PUD No.1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 711-13 (1994).
Thus, as conditions of a permit, water quality standards are
enforceable under the citizen suit provision of Section 505(f)
of the CWA. See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1995).
Since any activity discharging any pollutant into navigable waters is fundamentally prohibited by Section 301 of the
CWA, all potential dischargers must obtain an NPDES permit pursuant to Section 401 for such activity. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(a) and 1341. The enforcement and certification provisions of Section 401(d) require permits to set forth effluent
limitations that comply with Sections 301 and 302 as well as
appropriate requirements of state law. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d)
(1996) (See Appendix).
By allowing permits to contain "any other appropriate requirement of State law," Section 401(d) endorses the inclusion of water quality standards as conditions of a permit
because states are required to adopt water quality standards
pursuant to Section 303. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313 and 1341(d).
Also, Section 401(d) authorizes limitations on the permits
pursuant to Section 301, which incorporates the Section 303
water quality standards by reference. Thus, water quality
standards are viable conditions of a permit pursuant to Section 401(d) because they are both a "limitation" under Section
303 and an "appropriate requirement of State law." PUD
No.1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 715. This interpretation
of Section 401 is consistent with EPA regulations, which only
allow issuance of a permit if "there is reasonable assurance
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that the activity ...will not violate applicable water quality
standards." 40 C.F.R. 121.2(a)(3) (1997) (See Appendix). Not
only are water quality standards allowable restrictions of
NPDES permits pursuant to Section 401(d), but they are enforceable under the citizen suit provision Section 505(f). Section 505 allows citizens to enforce "an effluent limitation or
other limitation" under the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(f). Because Section 505(f) defines "effluent limitation"
as "... a permit or condition thereof," water quality standards
that have not been translated into end-of-pipe limitations are
enforceable conditions of a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f); see
also Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 986.
Therefore, even though XXX's permit does not contain
any effluent limitations for selenium, the EPA has promulgated limitations for selenium under the Safety Water Drinking Act. (R. at 5). Because the maximum acceptable level of
selenium in the Roaritan River is 0.05 mgl, XXX has violated
the water quality standards by elevating the selenium pollution to 0.06 mgl downstream of the discharge. (R. at 5). This
discharge has to stop because the activity is making the
Roaritan unfit for human consumption.
B.

According to case law and legislative records, effluent
limitations have supplemented, not replaced, the
regulatory role of water quality standards.

Effluent limitations, adopted in the 1972 Amendments,
do not replace water quality standards as a way of regulating
and protecting navigable waters. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
County, 511 U.S. at 704; Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d
at 986. Water quality standards provide a supplemental basis for monitoring water quality resulting from multiple discharges to ensure water quality meets acceptable levels
despite individual compliance with effluent limitations. See
EPA v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 426
U.S. 200, 205 n. 12 (1976). Congress endorses water quality
standards as both a means to measure performance and as
"an avenue of legal action against polluters." Northwest
Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 986 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3671).
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Moreover, regulating point source discharges through
both effluent limitations and water quality standards is the
policy adopted by the EPA. In a statement clarifying the
agency's interpretation of water quality-based effluent limitations, the EPA stated that "[w]ater-quality based limits are
established where the permitting authority reasonably anticipates the discharge of pollutants by the permitee at levels
that have the reasonable potential to cause or contribute to
an excursion above any state water quality criterion...." AtlanticStates Legal Found., 12 F.3d at 358 (quoting Memorandum from Director, Office of Wastewater Enforcement and
Compliance to Water Management Division Directors, Regions I-X, at 2-3 (Aug. 14, 1992)). By employing effluent limitations only for pollutants at risk of breaching of waterquality standards, the EPA must be utilizing a baseline level
of acceptable pollution, such as water quality standards, to
regulate those pollutants not assigned as effluent limitation
in the permit. Otherwise, the permits would not be valid, as
they must at least comply with water quality standards pursuant to Section 401(d). 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). Enforcement of
water quality standards in discharge permits is consistent
with the notion that effluent limitations have merely added to
the regulatory force of the CWA, not supplanted any previous
part of it.
C. Both effluent limitations and water quality standards
are imperative to the effective implementation of the
CWA.
Water quality standards are reserved as a basis for legal
action and regulation because both specific and broad limitations are required for the CWA to effectively protect all navigable waters in the United States. Water quality standards
complement effluent limitations just as the broad and specific
components of the water quality standards complement each
other. 40 C.F.R. §131.3(b) (1997) (See Appendix); PUD No.1
of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 716. The need for water
quality standards as a regulatory tool is also recognized by
the Supreme Court and other Circuit Courts of Appeals. See
PUD No.1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 723; Northwest
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Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 990; Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1115 (4th Cir. 1988).
If effluent limitations were intended to be the only regulatory tool employed under the 1972 Amendments, the CWA
would only regulate those pollutants whose effluent limitations have been properly developed and promulgated by federal or state agencies. While effluent limitations provide
useful, measurable limits to specific pollutants, the CWA prohibits the discharge of "any pollutant." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
Given the tens of thousands of chemical substances listed in
the Toxic Substances Control Act Chemical Substance Inventory, regulatory agencies could not practically develop efficient methods for identifying and measuring every known
pollutant. See Atlantic States Legal Found., 12 F.3d at 357.
While effluent limitations are effective for enforcing those
pollutants which have developed numeric criteria, water
quality standards provide an avenue for maintaining a baseline limitation for those pollutants that have not been specifically identified in individual permits. Furthermore, not
enforcing water quality standards would require states to
conduct detailed studies of the waters and activities of permit
applicants to fully protect designated uses via solely numeric
criteria. See PUD No.1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 71718. Recognizing the impossibility and burden of requiring
states to comply with the CWA through only numeric end-ofpipe limitations, the legislature retained the regulatory
power of water quality standards.
The enforcement of both designated use and water quality criteria components of water quality standards illustrates
the need to promulgate the CWA through both effluent limitations and water quality standards. Water quality standards
contain two components: 1) the designated use of the navigable water and 2) water quality criteria. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (See
Appendix); see also American PaperInstitute, Inc. v. EPA, 996
F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Though designated uses are
broader restrictions than numeric criteria, they "ensure that
each activity - even if not foreseen by the criteria - will be
consistent with the specific uses and attributes of a particular
body of water." PUD No.1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at
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716. The EPA echoes the recognition that numeric standards
are not always sufficient to protect designated uses: "[w]hen
criteria are met, water quality will generally protect the
designation use." 40 C.F.R. §131.3(b) (See Appendix) (emphasis added). Because the broader designated use component may be violated even though the specific water quality
criteria are met, the designated uses are independently enforceable. Similarly, as compliance with effluent limitations
does not ensure compliance with water quality standards,
these standards should be independently enforceable.
Disregarding the necessity for water quality standards to
effectively implement the CWA would disregard the decisions
of the Supreme Court and other Circuit Courts of Appeals,
which have explicitly endorsed the enforcement of water
quality standards in permits. See PUD No.1 of Jefferson
County, 511 U.S. at 723; Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d
at 990; Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d at 1115.
In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, the Supreme Court held
that an NPDES permit issued pursuant to Section 401 of the
CWA, may be used to enforce the designated use component
of water quality standards. 511 U.S. at 723. Following the
interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned its prior ruling in Northwest
Env'l. Advocates and held that citizens have standing to enforce water quality standards contained in an NPDES permit. 56 F.3d at 990.
The situation with XXX is a testament that while effluent limitations may be met, water quality standards may be
violated. If the court does not recognize independent enforcement of water quality standards dischargers like XXX will
reap privileges to pollute simply because the courts have constructed enforcement loopholes in the CWA.
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If the court chooses to enforce only effluent limitations
in permits, then a dischargerwho emits any
pollutant not expressly authorized by effluent
limitations violates the permit and the Clean
Water Act.

Water quality standards must be enforceable because an
NPDES permit only susceptible to enforcement of effluent
limitations is problematic. While a narrow interpretation of
the NPDES permit strictly enforces the CWA by penalizing
the discharge of any pollutant not specifically and numerically authorized, this interpretation places strain on litigation and the activities of dischargers. A broad interpretation,
however, gives dischargers a right to pollute and refutes the
language, intent, and precedent of permit enforcement of the
CWA. The logical middle ground is the enforcement of water
quality provisions that are included in permits. Water quality provisions help to force the polluting activity to remain
within the bounds of acceptable pollution levels, while still
protecting dischargers from penalties for discharging trace
levels of unforeseeable or immeasurable pollutants.
1.

Broad interpretationof effluent limitations conflicts
with statutory provisions, legislative intent, and
the strict enforcement of the CWA.
a. Both the language of Section 401 and the
"antidegradationpolicy" of the EPA are
inconsistent with a broad interpretationof
NPDES permits.

The statutory language of the CWA conflicts with a broad
interpretation of NPDES permits. Section 402(1) provides
that the Administrator or State "may ... issue a permit for
the discharge of any pollutant . .. upon the condition that
such discharge will meet ... all applicable requirements ... "
set forth by the other sections of that title. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1) (emphasis added). In no way does this language
imply that a right to pollute is afforded by an NPDES permit.
This language of Section 401 allows the discharge of pollutants only with a specific, controlled, and conditional permit.
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The "may" gives the Administrator discretion either to issue
the permit or leave the applicant to the total prohibition of
Section 301. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The permit XXX
obtained from the EPA authorized limited discharge activity
but did not give XXX free reign to discharge any pollutant not
otherwise restricted in the permit.
Furthermore, a right to pollute interpretation of the
NPDES permit would violate "antidegradation policy." Section 303 of the CWA explicitly requires states to set water
quality standards that prevent further degradation of navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (See Appendix). In response to
the language in Section 303, the EPA requires state to include "a statewide antidegradation policy" to ensure that "existing instream water uses and the level of water quality
necessary to protect the existing uses shall be maintained
and protected." 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (1997); see also PUD No.1
of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 704. Interpreting the XXX
permit to allow discharge of selenium despite the violation of
water quality standards would frustrate the antidegradation
policy specified by the EPA.
b. Legislative intent, especially with respect to
toxic pollutants, does not tolerate a right to
pollute interpretationof dischargepermits.
Legislative history illuminates Congress' intent that specific authorization under an NPDES permit is the only means
by which a discharger may escape total prohibition of Section
301(a). A Senate Report discussing Section 301 emphasized
that "this legislation would clearly establish that no one has
the right to pollute - that pollution continues because of technological limits, not because of any inherent rights to use the
nation's waterways for the purpose of disposing wastes."
Costle, 568 F.2d at 1374-75 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668).
The refusal to grant dischargers any right to pollute is
most forcefully communicated through the legislative concern
for toxic substances. The CWA states that national policy is
"that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be
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prohibited." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3). Because of the legislative determination to control the toxics problem, Congress
authorized the EPA to ban the discharge of toxic pollutants
pursuant to Section 307(a)(2) based solely on health and environmental concerns. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1996) (See Appendix). Clearly, there is little, if any, toleration of toxic
water pollutant discharge in violation of the CWA.
This zero tolerance for toxic pollutants is reflected in the
manner with which courts have applied strict liability in enforcing CWA violations. See Atlantic States Legal Found.,
Inc. v. Tyson Foods, 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir. 1990);
Stoddard v. W. CarolinaReg'l Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200,
1208 (4th Cir. 1986). In Northwest Envtl. Advocates, the
court illustrated the harsh enforcement of the Act in the face
of abatement measures estimated to cost the city of Portland
between $500 million and $1.2 billion dollars. See 56 F.3d at
981.
XXX asserts that the court should tolerate the pollution
of the Roaritan River with toxic substances because XXX is
not solely responsible for the concentration of selenium in the
River. Consideration of another discharger does not change
the fact that upstream of XXX the selenium concentration
meets applicable water quality standards and downstream it
does not. In fact, from a liability standpoint, the presence of
another discharger is no different than if the level of selenium in the water had been raised by non-point, unidentifiable sources; XXX is still causally responsible for the
violation of the water quality standards. XXX proposes a
broad interpretation of NPDES permits because it is the only
interpretation that would not subject it to penalties for violating the CWA. Unfortunately for XXX, extending dischargers
the right to pollute is clearly not consistent with the provisions or intent of the CWA and is refuted by existing case law.
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2. Narrow interpretationis consistent with the CWA
but would impede the enforcement of the CWA
with frivolous law suits and place a
tremendous burden on the states.
Because a broad interpretation of the authorization permitted under issuance of an NPDES permit would essentially
give dischargers a right to pollute and would frustrate the
very essence of the CWA, the court would have no choice but
to adhere to a strict interpretation of permits if water quality
standards were unenforceable. Under a narrow interpretation, a discharger would violate the terms of the permit
whenever a pollutant is discharged that has not been specifically authorized by the permit in the form of an effluent limitation. WAhile this interpretation would enforce strict,
controlled compliance with the CWA, it would also create a
situation where industries could be penalized for the discharge of even trace amounts of any pollutant not expressly
authorized by an effluent limitation. See Atlantic States
Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 357 (2nd
Cir. 1994). The burden and specificity required to rationally
limit every chemical present in effluent in order to protect industries from perpetual penalties would be tremendous. See
PUD No.1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 717-18; Atlantic
States Legal Found., 12 F.3d at 357. This interpretation
would ineffectively implement the CWA because courts would
be forced to address frivolous claims regarding trace amounts
of pollutants. In the interest of public policy, the court should
enforce water quality standards to avoid a strict interpretation of the permits, while still ensuring protection of the waters of the United States.
However, if the court does choose not to enforce water
quality standard provisions in the permits, this strict interpretation of NPDES authorization would still hold XXX accountable for violating its permit. No selenium was expressly
authorized in the XXX permit, so discharge of selenium is a
violation of the permit. XXX could have applied for authorization to discharge selenium at the time the permit was issued, especially because XXX was aware that it would be
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discharging selenium. To avoid violating the CWA, XXX
should either have complied with the conditions set forth in
the permit or taken a more proactive role in attaining a permit that reflected its activity. Claiming a right to pollute,
however, is not consistent with the CWA and therefore is not
an available assertion for XXX.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, FOR urges that the decision of
the United States District Court for the District of New
Union to deny the motion to dismiss filed by XXX should be
upheld with the exception that FOR urges that the District
Court's decision with regards to the reviewability of XXX's
NPDES permit be overruled.

43

576

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

APPENDIX
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a):
Except as in compliance with this section and sections
1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
33 U.S.C. § 1313:
(a) Existing water quality standards
(1) In order to carry out the purpose of this chapter, any
water quality standard applicable to interstate waters
which was adopted by any State and submitted to, and approved by, or is awaiting approval by, the Administrator
pursuant to this Act as in effect immediately prior to October 18, 1972, shall remain in effect unless the Administrator determined that such standard is not consistent with
the applicable requirements of this Act as in effect immediately prior to October 18, 1972. If the Administrator makes
such a determination he shall, within three months after
October 18, 1972, notify the State and specify the changes
needed to meet such requirements. If such changes are not
adopted by the State within ninety days after the date of
such notification, the Administrator shall promulgate such
changes in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(2) Any State which, before October 18, 1972, has adopted,
pursuant to its own law, water quality standards applicable to intrastate waters shall submit such standards to the
Administrator within thirty days after October 18, 1972.
Each such standard shall remain in effect, in the same
manner and to the same extent as any other water quality
standard established under this chapter unless the Administrator determines that such standard is inconsistent with
the applicable requirements of this Act as in effect immediately prior to October 18, 1972. If the Administrator makes
such a determination he shall not later than the one hundred and twentieth day after the date of submission of such
standards, notify the State and specify the changes needed
to meet such requirements. If such changes are not
adopted by the State within ninety days after such notifica-

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/7

44

19991

BRIEF

577

tion, the Administrator shall promulgate such changes in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(3)(A) Any State which prior to October 18, 1972, has not
adopted pursuant to its own laws water quality standards
applicable to intrastate waters shall, not later than one
hundred and eighty days after October 18, 1972, adopt and
submit such standards to the Administrator.
(B) If the Administrator determines that any such standards
are consistent with the applicable requirements of this Act
as in effect immediately prior to October 18, 1972, he shall
approve such standards.
(C) If the Administrator determines that any such standards
are not consistent with the applicable requirements of this
Act as in effect immediately prior to October 18, 1972, he
shall, not later than the ninetieth day after the date of submission of such standards, notify the State and specify the
changes to meet such requirements. If such changes are
not adopted by the State within ninety days after the date
of notification, the Administrator shall promulgate such
standards pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Proposed regulations
(1) The Administrator shall promptly prepare and publish
proposed regulations setting forth water quality standards
for a State in accordance with the applicable requirements
of this Act as in effect immediately prior to October 18,
1972, if(A) the State fails to submit water quality standards within
the times prescribed in subsection (a) of this section.
(B) a water quality standard submitted by such State under
subsection (a) of this section is determined by the Administrator not to be consistent with the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section.
(2) The Administrator shall promulgate any water quality
standard published in a proposed regulation not later than
one hundred and ninety days after the date he publishes
any such proposed standard, unless prior to such promulgation, such State has adopted a water quality standard
which the Administrator determines to be in accordance
with subsection (a) of this section.
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(c) Review; revised standard; publication
(1) The Governor of a State or the State water pollution control agency of such State shall from time to time (but at
least once each three year period beginning with October
18, 1972) hold public hearings for the purpose of reviewing
applicable water quality standards and, as appropriate,
modifying and adopting standards. Results of such review
shall be made available to the Administrator.
(2)(A) Whenever the State revises or adopts a new standard,
such revised or new standard shall be submitted to the Administrator. Such revised or new water quality standard
shall consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters
involved and the water quality criteria for such waters
based upon such uses. Such standards shall be such as to
protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of
water and serve the purposes of this chapter. Such standards shall be established taking into consideration their
use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish
and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and value for navigation.
(B) Whenever a State reviews water quality standards pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, or revises or adopts
new standards pursuant to this paragraph, such State
shall adopt criteria for all toxic pollutants listed pursuant
to section 1317(a)(1) of this title for which criteria have
been published under section 1314(a) of this title, the discharge or presence of which in the affected waters could
reasonably be expected to interfere with those designated
uses adopted by the State, as necessary to support such
designated uses. Such criteria shall be specific numerical
criteria for such toxic pollutants. Where such numerical
criteria are not available, whenever a State reviews water
quality standards pursuant to paragraph (1), or revises or
adopts new standards pursuant to this paragraph, such
State shall adopt criteria based on biological monitoring or
assessment methods consistent with information published
pursuant to section 1314(a)(8) of this title. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to limit or delay the use of efflu-
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ent limitations or other permit conditions based on or involving biological monitoring or assessment methods or
previously adopted numerical criteria.
(3) If the Administrator, within sixty days after the date of
submission of the revised or new standard, determines that
such standard meets the requirements of this chapter, such
standard shall thereafter be the water quality standard for
the applicable waters of that State. If the Administrator
determines that any such revised or new standard is not
consistent with the applicable requirements of this chapter,
he shall not later than the ninetieth day after the date of
submission of such standard notify the State and specify
the changes to meet such requirements. If such changes
are not adopted by the State within ninety days after the
date of notification, the Administrator shall promulgate
such standard pursuant to paragraph (4) of this subsection.
(4) The Administrator shall promptly prepare and publish
proposed regulations setting forth a revised or new water
quality standard for the navigable waters involved(A) if a revised or new water quality standard submitted by
such State under paragraph (3) of this subsection for such
waters is determined by the Administrator not to be consistent with the applicable requirements of this chapter, or
(B) in any case where the Administrator determines that a
revised or new standard is necessary to meet the requirements of this chapter.
The Administrator shall promulgate any revised or new standard under this paragraph not later than ninety days after
he publishes such proposed standards, unless prior to such
promulgation, such State has adopted a revised or new
water quality standard which the Administrator determines to be in accordance with this chapter.
(d) Identification of areas with insufficient controls; maximum daily load; certain effluent limitations revision
(1)(A) Each State shall identify those waters within its
boundaries for which the effluent limitations required by
section 1311(b)(1)(A) and section 1311(b)(1)(B) of this title
are not stringent enough to implement any water quality
standard applicable to such waters. The State shall estab-
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lish a priority ranking for such waters, taking into account
the severity of the pollution and the uses to be made of such
waters.
(B) Each State shall identify those waters or parts thereof
within its boundaries for which controls on thermal discharges under section 1311 of this title are not stringent
enough to assure protection and propagation of a balanced
indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife.
(C) Each State shall establish for the waters identified in paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, and in accordance with the
priority ranking, the total maximum daily load, for those
pollutants which the Administrator identifies under section
1314(a)(2) of this title as suitable for such calculation.
Such load shall be established at a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards with seasonal
variations and a margin of safety which takes into account
any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between
effluent limitations and water quality.
(D) Each State shall estimate for the waters identified in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection the total maximum daily
thermal load required to assure protection and propagation
of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish and
wildlife. Such estimates shall take into account the normal
water temperatures, flow rates, seasonal variations, existing sources of heat input, and the dissipative capacity of
the identified waters or parts thereof. Such estimates shall
include a calculation of the maximum heat input that can
be made into each such part and shall include a margin of
safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the development of thermal water quality criteria
for such protection and propagation in the identified waters
or parts thereof.
(2) Each State shall submit to the Administrator from time to
time, with the first such submission not later than one hundred and eighty days after the date of publication of the
first identification of pollutants under section 1314(a)(2)(D)
of this title, for his approval the waters identified and the
loads established under paragraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C),
and (1)(D) of this subsection. The Administrator shall
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either approve or disapprove such identification and load
not later than thirty days after the date of submission. If
the Administrator approves such identification and load,
such State shall incorporate them into its current plan
under subsection (e) of this section. If the Administrator
disapproves such identification and load, he shall not later
than thirty days after the date of such disapproval identify
such waters in such State and establish such loads for such
waters as he determines necessary to implement the water
quality standards applicable to such waters and upon such
identification and establishment the State shall incorporate them into its current plan under subsection (e) of this
section.
(3) For the specific purpose of developing information, each
State shall identify all waters within its boundaries which
it has not identified under paragraph (1)(A) and (1)(B) of
this subsection and estimate for such waters the total maximum daily load with seasonal variations and margins of
safety, for those pollutants which the Administrator identifies under section 1314(a)(2) of this title as suitable for such
calculation and for thermal discharges, at a level that
would assure protection and propagation of a balanced indigenous population of fish, shellfish and wildlife.
(4) Limitations on revision of certain effluent limitations
(A) Standard not attained
For waters identified under paragraph (1)(A) where the
applicable water quality standard has not yet been attained, any effluent limitation based on a total maximum
daily load or other waste load allocation established under
this section may be revised only if (i) the cumulative effect
of all such revised effluent limitations based on such total
maximum daily load or waste load allocation will assure
the attainment of such water quality standard, or (ii) the
designated use which is not being attained is removed in
accordance with regulations established under this section.
(B) Standard attained
For waters identified under paragraph (1)(A) where the
quality of such waters equals or exceeds levels necessary to
protect the designated use for such waters or otherwise re-
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quired by applicable water quality standards, any effluent
limitation based on a total maximum daily load or other
waste load allocation established under this section, or any
water quality standard established under this section, or
any other permitting standard may be revised only if such
revision is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation policy established under this section.
(e) Continuing planning process
(1) Each State shall have a continuing planning process approved under paragraph (2) of this subsection which is consistent with this chapter.
(2) Each State shall submit not later than 120 days after October 18, 1972, to the Administrator for his approval a proposed continuing planning process which is consistent with
this chapter. Not later than thirty days after the date of
submission of such a process the Administrator shall either
approve or disapprove such process. The Administrator
shall from time to time review each State's approved planning process for the purpose of insuring that such planning
process is at all times consistent with this chapter. The Administrator shall not approve any State permit program
under subchapter IV of this chapter for any State which
does not have an approved continuing planning process
under this section.
(3) The Administrator shall approve any continuing planning
process submitted to him under this section which will result in plans for all navigable waters within such State,
which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(A) effluent limitations and schedules of compliance at least
as stringent as those required by section 1311(b)(1), section
1311(b)(2), section 1316, and section 1317 of this title, and
at least as stringent as any requirements contained in any
applicable water quality standard in effect under authority
of this section;
(B) the incorporation of all elements of any applicable areawide waste management plans under section 1288 of this
title, and applicable basin plans under section 1289 of this
title;
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(C) total maximum daily load for pollutants in accordance
with subsection (d) of this section;
(D) procedures for revision;
(E) adequate authority for intergovernmental cooperation;
(F) adequate implementation, including schedules of compliance, for revised or new water quality standards, under
subsection (c) of this section;
(G) controls over the disposition of all residual waste from
any water treatment processing;
(H) an inventory and ranking, in order of priority, of needs for
construction of waste treatment works required to meet the
applicable requirements of sections 1311 and 1312 of this
title.
(f) Earlier compliance
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any effluent limitation, or schedule of compliance required by any
State to be implemented prior to the dates set forth in sections 1311(b)(1) and 1311(b)(2) of this title nor to preclude
any State from requiring compliance with any effluent limitation or schedule of compliance at dates earlier than such
dates.
(g) Heat standards
Water quality standards relating to heat shall be consistent
with the requirements of section 1326 of this title.
(h) Thermal water quality standards
For the purposes of this chapter the term "water quality standards" includes thermal water quality standards.
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2):
Each toxic pollutant listed in accordance with paragraph
(1) of this subsection shall be subject to effluent limitations
resulting from the application of the best available technology economically achievable for the applicable category or
class of point sources established in accordance with sections 1311(b)(2)(A) and 1314(b)(2) of this title. The Administrator, in his discretion, may publish in the Federal
Register a proposed effluent standard (which may include a
prohibition) establishing requirements for a toxic pollutant
which, if an effluent limitation is applicable to a class or
category of point sources, shall be applicable to such cate-
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gory or class only if such standard imposes more stringent
requirements. Such published effluent standard (or prohibition) shall take into account the toxicity of the pollutant,
its persistence, degradability, the usual or potential presence of the affected organisms in any waters, the importance of the affected organisms and the nature and extent
of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms, and
the extent to which effective control is being or may be
achieved under other regulatory authority. The Administrator shall allow a period of not less than sixty days following publication of any such proposed effluent standard (or
prohibition) for written comment by interested persons on
such proposed standard. In addition, if within thirty days
of publication of any such proposed effluent standard (or
prohibition) any interested person so requests, the Administrator shall hold a public hearing in connection therewith. Such a public hearing shall provide an opportunity
for oral and written presentations, such cross-examination
as the Administrator determines is appropriate on disputed issues of material fact, and the transcription of a verbatim record which shall be available to the public. After
consideration of such comments and any information and
material presented at any public hearing held on such proposed standard or prohibition, the Administrator shall promulgate such standard (or prohibition) with such
modification as the Administrator finds are justified. Such
promulgation by the Administrator shall be made within
two hundred and seventy days after publication of proposed standard (or prohibition). Such standard (or prohibition) shall be final except that if, on judicial review, such
standard was not based on substantial evidence, the Administrator shall promulgate a revised standard. Effluent
limitations shall be established in accordance with sections
1311(b)(2)(A) and 1314(b)(2) of this title for every toxic pollutant referred to in table 1 of Committee Print Numbered
95-30 of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House of Representatives as soon as practicable
after December 27, 1977, but no later than July 1, 1980.
Such effluent limitations or effluent standards (or prohibi-
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tions) shall be established for every other toxic pollutant
listed under paragraph (1) of this subsection as soon as
practicable after it is so listed.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(d):
Any certification provided under this section shall set
forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and
monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will comply with any
applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under
section 1311 or 1312 of this title, standard of performance
under section 1316 of this title, or prohibition, effluent
standard, or pretreatment standard under section 1317 of
this title, and with any other appropriate requirement of
State law set forth in such certification, and shall become a
condition on any Federal license or permit subject to the
provisions of this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b):
At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines required by subsection (i)(2) of section 1314 of this title, the
Governor of each State desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its
jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full and
complete description of the program it proposes to establish
and administer under State law or under an interstate
compact. In addition, such State shall submit a statement
from the attorney general (or the attorney for those State
water pollution control agencies which have independent
legal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in the case of
an interstate agency, that the laws of such State, or the
interstate compact, as the case may be, provide adequate
authority to carry out the described program. The Administrator shall approve each such submitted program unless
he determines that adequate authority does not exist:
(1) To issue permits which(A) apply, and insure compliance with, any applicable requirements of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of
this title;
(B) are for fixed terms not exceeding five years; and
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(C) can be terminated or modified for cause including, but not
limited to, the following:
(i) violation of any condition of the permit;
(ii) obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, or failure to disclose fully all relevant facts;
(iii) change in any condition that requires either a temporary
or permanent reduction or elimination of the permitted
discharge;
(D) control the disposal of pollutants into wells;
(2)(A) To issue permits which apply, and insure compliance
with, all applicable requirements of section 1318 of this title; or
(B) To inspect, monitor, enter, and require reports to at least
the same extent as required in section 1318 of this title;
(3) To insure that the public, and any other State the waters
of which may be affected, receive notice of each application
for a permit and to provide an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling on each such application;
(4) To insure that the Administrator receives notice of each
application (including a copy thereof) for a permit;
(5) To insure that any State (other than the permitting
State), whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a
permit may submit written recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any
permit application and, if any part of such written recommendations are not accepted by the permitting State, that
the permitting State will notify such affected State (and the
Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such
recommendations together with its reasons for so doing;
(6) To insure that no permit will be issued if, in the judgment
of the Secretary of the Army acting through the Chief of
Engineers, after consultation with the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating,
anchorage and navigation of any of the navigable waters
would be substantially impaired thereby;
(7) To abate violations of the permit or the permit program,
including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and
means of enforcement;
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(8) To insure that any permit for a discharge from a publicly
owned treatment works includes conditions to require the
identification in terms of character and volume of pollutants of any significant source introducing pollutants subject to pretreatment standards under section 1317(b) of this
title into such works and a program to assure compliance
with such pretreatment standards by each such source, in
addition to adequate notice to the permitting agency of (A)
new introductions into such works of pollutants from any
source which would be a new source as defined in section
1316 of this title if such source were discharging pollutants,
(B) new introductions of pollutants into such works from a
source which would be subject to section 1311 of this title if
it were discharging such pollutants, or (C) a substantial
change in volume or character of pollutants being introduced into such works by a source introducing pollutants
into such works at the time of issuance of the permit. Such
notice shall include information on the quality and quantity of effluent to be introduced into such treatment works
and any anticipated impact of such change in the quantity
or quality of effluent to be discharged from such publicly
owned treatment works; and
(9) To insure that any industrial user of any publicly owned
treatment works will comply with sections 1284(b), 1317,
and 1318 of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1):
Not later than ninety days after the date on which a
State has submitted a program (or revision thereof) pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator shall
suspend the issuance of permits under subsection (a) of this
section as to those discharges subject to such program unless he determines that the State permit program does not
meet the requirements of subsection (b) of this section or
does not conform to the guidelines issued under section
1314(i)(2) of this title. If the Administrator so determines,
he shall notify the State of any revisions or modifications
necessary to conform to such requirements or guidelines.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3):
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Whenever the Administrator determines after public
hearing that a State is not administering a program approved under this section in accordance with requirements
of this section, he shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reasonable time,
not to exceed ninety days, the Administrator shall withdraw approval of such program. The Administrator shall
not withdraw approval of any such program unless he shall
first have notified the State, and made public, in writing,
the reasons for such withdrawal.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2):
No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator within
ninety days of the date of his notification under subsection
(b)(5) of this section objects in writing to the issuance of
such permit, or (B) if the Administrator within ninety days
of the date of transmittal of the proposed permit by the
State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as
being outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter. Whenever the Administrator objects to the issuance of
a permit under this paragraph such written objection shall
contain a statement of the reasons for such objection and
the effluent limitations and conditions which such permit
would include if it were issued by the Administrator.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4):
In any case where, after December 27, 1977, the Administrator, pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection, objects to the issuance of a permit, on request of the State, a
public hearing shall be held by the Administrator on such
objection. If the State does not resubmit such permit revised to meet such objection within 30 days after completion of the hearing, or, if no hearing is requested within 90
days after the date of such objection, the Administrator
may issue the permit pursuant to subsection (a) of this section for such source in accordance with the guidelines and
requirements of this chapter.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7):
The term "navigable waters" means the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a):
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Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and
section 1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a
civil action on his own behalf(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and
(ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to
the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties,
to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such
an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act
or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate
civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(f):
For purposes of this section, the term "effluent standard
or limitation under this chapter" means (1) effective July 1,
1973, an unlawful act under subsection (a) of section 1311
of this title; (2) an effluent limitation or other limitation
under section 1311 or 1312 of this title; (3) standard of performance under section 1316 of this title; (4) prohibition,
effluent standard or pretreatment standards under section
1317 of this title; (5) certification under section 1341 of this
title; (6) a permit or condition thereof issued under section
1342 of this title, which is in effect under this chapter (including a requirement applicable by reason of section 1323
of this title); or (7) a regulation under section 1345(d) of
this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1370:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in
this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any
State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to
adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting
discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting
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control or abatement of pollution; except that if an effluent
limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is
in effect under this chapter, such State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance which is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition,
pretreatment standard, or standard of performance under
this chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any
manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States
with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of
such States.
40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3):
A statement that there is a reasonable assurance that
the activity will be conducted in a manner which will not
violate applicable water quality standards;
40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b):
Criteria are elements of State water quality standards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative
statements, representing a quality of water that supports a
particular use. When criteria are met, water quality will
generally protect the designated use.
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